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[分享] PatchGuard不是Windows才有的东西

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Dizziness2929
 楼主| 发表于 2024-4-29 18:55:00 | 显示全部楼层
00006666 发表于 2024-4-29 18:53
windows还有System Guard这种东西

https://learn.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows/security/hardware-sec ...

Linux:我有更骚的

https://osresearch.net/
blah
发表于 2024-4-29 19:06:53 | 显示全部楼层
Dizziness2929 发表于 2024-4-29 17:23
那么可以去找那几个开源内核Rootkit试一下(

https://github.com/milabs/awesome-linux-rootkits为例,至少目前版本的LKRG只会oops
Dizziness2929
 楼主| 发表于 2024-4-29 19:19:37 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Dizziness2929 于 2024-4-29 19:34 编辑

我想引用一句话:有些人是觉得自己懂了某种编程方法,就觉得自己明白了整个计算机,可实际上呢?

请好好阅读LKRG配置文件和文档,否则我会将你后续的一切回答都视为骚扰信息而拒绝回复。

实际上在使用LKRG时,是从最宽松一步一步调到最严格,没有多少人会用“默认配置”,这也是LKRG项目组不希望看到的。

https://github.com/lkrg-org/lkrg ... ts/bootup/lkrg.conf

Quick choice of a pre-defined profile controlling whether and how LKRG acts
# on detected integrity violations and attacks.  Allowed values are 0 (log and
# accept), 1 (selective), 2 (strict), and 3 (paranoid).  Additionally, this
# setting will read as 9 (custom) if an underlying setting is changed directly
# (potentially deviating from any of the profiles).
#
# Higher-numbered enforcement profiles provide higher likelihood of mitigating
# a compromise or stopping an attack, but also a higher risk of interfering
# with normal system behavior and to a worse extent in case of false positives.
#
# lkrg.profile_enforce=0 can be used for safe testing of LKRG, where any
# detected violations and attacks are logged but no enforcement is performed.
# It can also be useful where LKRG is meant to act as a sensor within a larger
# security monitoring and response setup (e.g., network-wide).
#
# lkrg.profile_enforce=1 performs selective enforcement - log only for kernel
# integrity violations, varying effective actions ranging from killing a task
# to triggering a kernel panic for other types of violations and attacks.
# This mode is extremely unlikely to panic the kernel on a false positive.
#
# lkrg.profile_enforce=2 performs strict enforcement - varying effective
# actions for all types of violations and attacks, including triggering a
# kernel panic for kernel integrity violations.
#
# lkrg.profile_enforce=3 performs the most paranoid enforcement - kernel panic
# for all types of violations and attacks.
#
# Choosing an enforcement profile sets the following underlying settings, which
# are described further below: kint_enforce, pint_enforce, pcfi_enforce,
# umh_enforce, smep_enforce, and smap_enforce.
#
# Also relevant is the kernel's kernel.panic sysctl and panic parameter, which
# makes the system reboot on kernel panic.  For example, kernel.panic=60 in
# /etc/sysctl.conf or in a file under the /etc/sysctl.d directory, or panic=60
# on the kernel's command-line, will make the system reboot in 60 seconds after
# a panic.  This provides a brief opportunity to read the panic message on the
# console yet makes an unattended server try to come back up on its own.
#
# Profiles are currently available via sysctl only - there are no corresponding
# module parameters.  However, the individual underlying settings, which are
# described further below, do have their corresponding module parameters.
#

Dizziness2929
 楼主| 发表于 2024-4-29 19:38:20 | 显示全部楼层
blah 发表于 2024-4-29 19:06
以https://github.com/milabs/awesome-linux-rootkits为例,至少目前版本的LKRG只会oops



而且我都还没提你这是六年前就停更的Rootkit。

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DisaPDB
发表于 2024-4-29 19:57:23 | 显示全部楼层
00006666 发表于 2024-4-29 18:53
windows还有System Guard这种东西

https://learn.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows/security/hardware-sec ...
每当请求其中一个系统操作时,会在运行时调用不可屏蔽的中断 (SMI) ,这将执行 BIOS 安装的 SMM 代码。 SMM 代码以最高特权级别执行,并且对 OS 不可见,这使得它成为恶意活动的有吸引力的目标。 即使System Guard安全启动用于延迟启动,SMM 代码也可能访问虚拟机监控程序内存并更改虚拟机监控程序。

这个必须依赖硬件支持了,作为HyperVisitor来对Guest进行完全监视
DisaPDB
发表于 2024-4-29 19:58:48 | 显示全部楼层
Dizziness2929 发表于 2024-4-29 18:55
Linux:我有更骚的

https://osresearch.net/

这个倒还真不如Windows+Intel在理想状态下全开的TDT
00006666
发表于 2024-4-29 20:01:15 | 显示全部楼层
DisaPDB 发表于 2024-4-29 19:57
这个必须依赖硬件支持了,作为HyperVisitor来对Guest进行完全监视

windows有相当多安全功能的兼容性十分糟糕,就没见到几台电脑可以开
Dizziness2929
 楼主| 发表于 2024-4-29 20:01:55 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Dizziness2929 于 2024-4-29 20:03 编辑
DisaPDB 发表于 2024-4-29 19:58
这个倒还真不如Windows+Intel在理想状态下全开的TDT

然而Intel ME(TDT的底层核心部分)就是个漏洞来源,不过这个未来再说。

可以先给两篇参考资料做预告:https://www.secrss.com/articles/34854

https://www.secrss.com/articles/3705
DisaPDB
发表于 2024-4-29 21:13:58 | 显示全部楼层
Dizziness2929 发表于 2024-4-29 20:01
然而Intel ME(TDT的底层核心部分)就是个漏洞来源,不过这个未来再说。

可以先给两篇参考资料做预告 ...

ME确实是个很大的安全隐患
但是利用难度太高了,我至今没有见过再野利用
ANY.LNK
发表于 2024-4-29 22:09:02 | 显示全部楼层
blah 发表于 2024-4-29 10:25
Windows想实现结束恶意进程又不是难事,调个ZwTerminateProcess就行,。LKRG结束进程也是靠的send_sig_info ...

ZwProcessTerminate从R0到R3降维打击应用层的进程还可以,对内核态的东西就不太行了。内核态Rootkit基本上指望不上它
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